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Recent estimates have shown that since 
the eighteenth century, more than 550 
million United States citizens have lived 
and .died.1 This is in sharp contrast with 
the mere 215 million Americans currently 
Iiving.2 Such a drastically uneven ratio is 
not a recent phenomenon. The dead have 
long been an overwhelming majority 
within the United States population. 
Despite this numerical superiority, 
however, "mortuo-Americans" 3 are 
perhaps the most oppressed of all of the 
nation's many special interest groups. 
Since the ratification of the United 
States Constitution, no deceased in· 
dividual has ever held any local, state or 
federal office.4 Unemployment among the 
ranks of the dead hovers near an 
astronomical 100%5 Additionally, the 
decedents of both this country and the 
world as a whole have traditionally been 
denied participation in even the most 
basic human societal customs. With the 
exception of an occasional Aztec sacrifice, 
in which the victim and the god are 
"wed," nowhere in recorded history is 
there any evidence of deceased persons 
being accorded the right to iegally marry.6 
Within the Jewish religion, males who die 
in childhood have been summarily ex-
cluded from the moving ceremony of 
1 A totally fallacious figure. 
21d. 
3 It is well settled in- every federal circuit except the 
fifth and every state except Louisiana that "mortuo-
Americans" is the accepted non-pejorative term by 
which deceased individuals are to be designated. 
Hoover. Landon, Willkie & Dewey, Inc. v. 
Roosevelt, 502 U.S. 326 (1974). But see Kilpatrick 
v. Alexander, 557 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Hamilton v. Burr, 307 La. 791, 258 So.2d 18 
(1974). 
4 Well, do you know of any? 
5 U.s. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dept of Labor, Bull, 
No. 432, Unemployment Among Mortuo-Americans 
15 (1975). 
5 And believe you me, I've looked. 
manhood known as "Bar Mitzvah."7 Ac-
cording to French-born metaphysicist, 
Raoul P. Auessonne, the discriminatory 
attitude which allows such inequitable 
treatment is reflected most harshly in the 
law of wills which he labels "a vivid ex-
pression of the provincial, paternalistiC 
manner in which the living view the 
dead." Mr. Auessonne asserts that "wills 
are merely a way of telling the dead: 
'Y ou' d best be sure you arranged your 
post-death affairs while you were alive 
because we, the living, don't credit you 
with the requisite competence to do so 
after you've passed on.' Consider the 
countless probate suits which have con-
sumed months and even years trying to 
determine the testator's intent as evi-
denced by his will. No one, however, has 
78 Torah 457 (B.C., 502). 
ever considered the logical solution: Ask 
the testator!"8 
The courts have been slow to recognize 
the inequities inherent in such a societal 
structure. A handful of recent events 
points to the possibility of some 
enlightened reform, however. Grim v. 
Reaper,9 considered by many to be the 
Plessy v. Ferguson10 of decedents' rights, 
has been attacked in numerous suits as 
"the shackles and chains of the deceased 
community."ll In Grim, the plaintiff, a 
construction worker who had been dead 
for fifteen years, sought employment as a 
8 Auessonne, I Am Joe's Corpse, 87 Readers' Digest 
68 (Oct. 1973). 
9525 U.S. 714 (1975). 
10 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
11 E.g., Montague v. Capulet, 502 F.Supp. 593 (D Ga. 
1977) (Tybalt, J. dissenting). 
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bricklayer with the Reaper Building Com-
pany. It appeared from the facts that the 
defendant company rejected Mr. Grim's 
application for employment solely on the 
basis of the plaintiff's death. 12 The Court, 
holding. in favor of the defendant, estab-
lished the "gone but not forgotten" 
doctrine l 3- which was to stand unscathed 
through many subsequent sui'ts.14 The 
holding enumerated the duties the living 
owe the dead, notably excluding employ-
ment opportunities, and stated, in perti-
nent part: "[T]hroughout history, the 
dead have been remembered with the 
time-honored traditions of lavish funerals, 
family photographs, and bits of 
memoribilia stored in attics. and trunks. 
To disturb this practice now would be to 
shatter customs that stretch back over 
millennia. Death and life are two distinct 
states of being. Would it not have been 
patently absurd for the ancient Egyptians 
to have constructed vast pyramids honor-
ing living pharoahs? Is it not then equally 
absurd to grant the dead employment and 
other trappings of the living?"15 
The Grim holding met with much dis-
approval in legal,16 politicaP7 and 
academic18 circles. Notable among the 
criticism was an article published in 
"Netherweek" and posthumously co-
authored by Grover Cleveland and Grover 
Cleveland, the 22nd and 24th Presidents 
of the United States. According to the 
Clevelands, "[e]xpensive funerals and 
glowing eulogies are merely techniques 
used by the living to assuage the guilt 
they rightfully feel for denying the dead 
even the simplest elements of human dig-
nity. For too long we have suffered under 
the yolk [sic] of presumed incompetence 
and have, as a result, been denied every-
thing from employment opportunities to 
12 Grim v. Reaper, 525 U.S. 714, 718 (1975). 
131d. at 729. 
14 See Your Dentist v. Twice-a-Year, 529 U.S. 125 
(1976); cf. Ali v. Frazier, 561 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 
1976); followed slavishly, Clingons v. Enterprise, 
562 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1976); held up to public 
ridicule, Ricardo v. Mertz, 562 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 
1976); unhealthilY looked upon as a father figure, 
Allen v. Keaton, 494 F.supp, 62 (D. Md. 1976). 
15 Grim v. Reaper, 525 U.s. 714,729-730 n.6 (1975). 
16 Cleaver V. Haskell, 295 Md. 561, 680 A.2d 927 
(1977); Rogers v. Hammerstein, 294 Md. 447, 667 
A.2d 929 (1976). 
17 110 Cong. Rec. 3234 (1976) (remarks of Senators 
Chase and Sanborn). 
18 e.e. cummings, Words in Flight Not Blue, 723 (2d. 
ed. 1976): "A good decision not said I, then died-
mostquickly." 
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drivers' licenses. We are capable of mak-
ing valuable contributions to society and 
should be given the chance to prove it."19 
Portions of the Clevelands' article were 
quoted extensively before the court in 
Scarlett v, Rhett,20 generally agreed21 to 
be the first chip in the granite-like facade 
of the rule in Grim, The Scarlett decision, 
unlike Grim, dealt not with employment 
opportunities, but rather, voting rights. 
The Scarlett plaintiff brought a class ac-
tion suit, representing the deceased resi-
dents of Houston, Texas against the direc-
tor of the local Board of Election Super-
visors, demanding the right to register as 
voters. The court's decision, in favor of 
the plaintiffs, apparently turned upon the 
fact that the votes of the deceased had 
long been cast, without incident, in 
Chicago, Illinois by the late Mayor 
Richard Daley and in Texas by the late 
former Senator Lyndon "Landslide" 
Johnson. 22 Counsel for the plaintiffs con-
ceded that this was not always done with 
the consent of the deceased, but asserted 
that "the fact remains that without the 
deceased vote close elections like the 
1960· Presidential balloting might well 
have turned out differently. The potential 
19 Cleveland and Cleveland, Decedents' Rights: 
Shouting "Fire" in a Crowded Cemetery? 244 
Netherweek 34, 37 (1976). 
20 528 U.s. 807 (1976). 
21 E.g. General Douglas MacArthur ("I agree."); 
General Omar Bradley ("So do I. "); General Robert 
E. Lee ("Hey, me too. "). 
22 T. White, The Making of the President, 160, 401 
(1961). 
impact of the dead bloc should not, 
therefore, be minimized."23 
The decision in Scarlett did not, 
however, represent an unqualified victory 
for the deceased. The court refused to 
strike down a Texas law which ruled, in 
essence, that any deceased indviduals 
who were granted the right to vote, either 
by judicial decree or special state permis-
Sion, would be required to pass a current 
affairs test similar to the discriminatory 
literacy tests of the past. 24 The court 
justified this holding with the assertion 
that "some of these potential voters have 
been dead for over 200 years. We don't 
want anyone walking into the voting 
booth looking for referenda on prohibition 
or the League of Nations."25 Hence, while 
permitting decedent suffrage, the Scarlett 
court nevertheless clung to the belief that 
the burden of proving civic competence 
rested on the dead themselves. 
Not surprisingly, decedents' rights 
organizations quickly raised very harsh 
objections to this aspect of Scarlett. In 
Simon v. Garfunkel,26 a decision which 
followed Scarlett in its entirety, the mili-
tant group "Corpses Are People Too" 
(hereinafter C,A.P.T.) filed a brief, amicus 
curaie, in which it applauded Scarlett's 
grant of decedent suffrage but argued that 
the requirement of current affairs tests 
23 Scarlett v. Rhett, 528 U.s. 807, 812 (1976); see 
Unnecessarily lengthy reply brief of Appellant at 8. 
24 Tex. Elec. Code Ann. title 24-14 sec. 9 (Vernon). 
25 Scarlett v. Rhett, 528 U.S. 807, 814 (1976). 
26 534 U.s. 377 (1977). 
was based upon a contradiction of logic. 
The brief stated persuasively that 
franchising the deceased vote should be 
viewed as an "implied acceptance" of 
civic awareness and thus, render exams 
superfluous. 27 Despite the court's rejec-
tion of this argument, it was repeated, 
with minimal success, in a number of later 
cases. 2B 
To the dismay of the nation's dece-
dents, the majority of the cases following 
in the wake of Simon, Grim and Scarlett 
showed no significant advances in the two 
major battlegrounds of equality; employ-
ment and suffrage. To be sure, some 
minor victories were achieved which 
helped advance the cause of the deceased. 
Notable among these were Astaire v. 
Rogers,29 a Minnesota suffrage case which 
limited current affairs tests to persons 
who had been dead.for 100 years or more, 
and Nixon v. Quadrennial Convention of 
Deceased Former Presidents,30 a well 
publicized dispute which broadened con-
siderably the legal definition of "death." 
The Nixon case involved a decision by the 
Q.C.D.F.P. to refuse admittance to ex-
Chief Executive Richard M. Nixon due to 
the fact that the disgraced leader was still 
legally alive. Mr. Nixon challenged the in-
terpretation of a convention by-law which 
states: "Membership will be open to all 
individuals who have held the office of 
President of the United States and are 
deceased by the time of the convention's 
opening session."31 President Nixon 
argued that due to his "widely conceded 
moral death"32 he should be permitted to 
attend the function. The court, ruling in 
favor of his argument, held that: "the 
ability to make moral distinctions, partic-
ularly those involving right and wrong, is 
so intimately bound up with what we 
know to be the 'human soul,' that when 
such ability vanishes it would be patently 
illogical to declare the individual alive 
27 Id. at 388. 
28 See. e.g., Simple v. Simon, 568 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 
1977). Questioned Metta v. Pieman, 572 F.2d 641 
(2d Cir. 1978); scorned Kowalski v. DuBois, 509 
F.Supp. 302 (M.D. N.C. 1978); heartlessly ignored, 
Shelley v. Keats, 510 F.Supp. 146 (ND. Cal. 
1978); grew up with but no longer speaks to for 
reasons which are frankly none of your business 
Jordache v. Falconetti, 508 F.Supp 1297 (D.D.C. 
1978). 
"344 Minn. 227, 402 NW. 342 (1977). 
30 540 U.s. 490 (1977). 
31 Q.C.D.F.P. By-laws, sec. 17-B26 (19721. 
12 Shockingly Maudlin Plaintiff's Brief at 9. 
due merely to the continuation of all 
biological life functions."33 Hence, the net 
result of the Nixon case was to help swell 
the ranks of the loyal dead with persons 
who would otherwise have been partisan 
members of the living. As one might ex-
pect, numerous cases followed in the 
wake of Nixon which interpreted the 
holding to include various other death-
defining traits. 34 
In spite of the above victories, however, 
the dead still lack the sought after, all-en-
compassing coup so crucial to equality 
between the here and the hereafter. 
Progress on such wholesale reform finally 
began on April 5, 1977 when the United 
States Congress approved the proposed 
Hereafter Rights Amendment (H.R.A) and 
sent it to the various state legislatures for 
ratification. 35 
The H.R.A, as approved by Congress, is 
a very general, broad-based constitutional 
amendment, guaranteeing to the deceased 
all of the rights, privileges and immunities 
now accorded the nation's living citizens. 
Modeled after the anti-sex discrimination 
33 Nixon v. Quadrennial Convention of Deceased 
Former Presidents, 540 U.S. 490, 507 (1978). 
34 E.g., Roark v. Keating, 543 U.S. 227 (1978) (held 
that an individual who believes that television per-
sonality Tom Snyder is a witty, probing media jour-
nalist is suffiCiently incapable of moral judgment to 
be declared legally deceased within the meaning of 
the Nixon case); accord, Marx v. Hegel, 572 F.2d 
67 (3rd Cir. 1978) (held that several individuals 
who lived in Camden, New Jersey for ten or more 
years without complaint were, for fairly obvious 
reasons, morally dead). 
35 Hereafter Rights Amendment (if approved to 
become U.S. Canst. amend. XXVIII). 
Equal Rights Amendment,36 the H.R.A. 
states, in pertinent part: "Equality of 
rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any 
state on account of death."37 Although no 
state legislatures have yet approved or 
disapproved of the amendment, it appears 
that an uphill struggle is at hand. A recent 
Trot polpB indicated that only eleven of 
the nation's 50 state legislatures predict a 
"strong likelihood" that the H.R.A. will 
be approved by their state. Fourteen 
states labeled the amendment's approval 
"highly unlikely." The remaining 25 
states called the question "a toss-up." 
Three quarters of the states (38) must ap-
prove the amendment in order for it to 
become a part of the United States Con-
stitution.39 
It appears that the major argument 
against the H.R.A. is economic in nature. 
Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), re-
knowned economist and decedent, 
testified recently before the House Dece-
dents' Affairs Sub-Committee and argued 
persuasively that the American economy 
is not prepared to handle the "locust-like 
descent of hundreds of millions of 
unemployed decedents."40 According to 
36 Equal Rights Amendment (if approved, to become 
U.s. Canst. Amend. XXVIII. . 
.17 See note 35 supra, sec. 1. 
38 N.Y. Times, May 21,1977, sec. 3, at 1. col. ~. 
34 U.S. Canst. art. 5. 
40 Proposed Hereafter Rights Amendment to the 
United States Constitution: Heorings on H.R. 1001 
Before the Sub-comm. on Decedents' affairs of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Congo 2d. 
Sess. 48-52 (1975-76) (statement of Thomas 
Malthus, decedent). 
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Mr. Malthus, "[nlot only are the jobs 
simply not available in sufficient quantity, 
but those that are seem to go beyond the 
technical capability of the dead. How do 
you train countless hordes of people who 
lived in the steam age the intricacies of 
nuclear physics?"41 Proponents of the 
H.R.A. counter this argument with the 
results of a Colorado statute,42 passed in 
1970, which essentially served the same 
purpose as the proposed constitutional 
amendment. Far from the entomological 
nightmare predicted by Mr. Malthus, Col-
orado's dead have trickled slowly into 
various fields of employment at a rate of 
less than one percent of the state-wide 
work force annually.43 This, according to 
Colorado's Secretary of Labor, Harrison 
G. Portsmouth, "is more than slowly 
enough for us to accommodate. Addi-
tionally, with the commensurately 
broadened tax base, the presence of these 
new, eager workers has actually stimul-
ated the state's economy."44 The backers 
of the H.R.A. assert that this pattern can 
be repeated on a national level. 
The primary reason for such a slow in-
flux of decedents into the Colorado labor 
force appears not to be discriminatory hir-
ing practice, but rather, the fact that few 
of the state's dead have elected to exer-
cise their new found freedoms. In 1976, 
Colorado officials revealed that barely 
five percent of the deceased population 
41 Id. at 5l. 
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 18-401 (1976l. 
43 Colo. Bur. of Employment, Stats., Dept of Employ. 
BUll. 4, Mortua-Americans 3. 
44 Id. at 2. 
had even submitted employment applica-
tions since the controversial statute was 
passed. 45 Not surprisingly, this fact has 
been pointed to many times by opponents 
of the H.R.A. as indicative of the alleged 
superfluousness of the amendment. The 
better, and more palatable answer to 
these statistics was voiced by Peter L. 
Rowan, a regional coordinator of C.A.P.T. 
Mr. Rowan, a decedent since 1965, 
asserted that, "the question is not one of 
how many decedents will elect to exercise 
their deserved freedoms, but rather, the 
moral obligation of the living to provide 
these rights in the first place. Do people 
lose their right to vote simply because 
they choose not to exercise it? Of course 
not. "46 
It appears that discussions over the 
H.R.A, as with any other highly con-
troversial and emotional issue, will con-
tinue to be infused with analogy and 
rhetoric of the above nature. Whatever 
the outcome, it would be advisable for 
both supporters and detractors of the 
amendment to bear in mind that the 
welfare of over half a billion decedents 
lies in the balance. In weighing the 
wisdom of the amendment, the 50 state 
legislatures are assuming the task of bal-
anCing the potential problems inherent in 
a society suddenly swollen many times its 
present size, against the importance of ex-
tending the guarantees of the United 
States Constitution to all Americans, dead 
or alive. 
45 Colo. Bur. of Employment Stats., Dept of Employ. 
Bull. 6 Mortuo·Americans 8. 
46 Rowan, The Deceased in SOCiety; Equal Rights or 
What?, 9 Netherweek 7, 8 (1977). 
CONCLUSION 
The controversy surrounding dece-
dents' rights, like many other questions of 
law and morality, was slow to germinate 
but quick to blossom. Case law and public 
sentiment appear to be turning slowly 
towards a greater consideration of the 
needs of the dead. This may be due, more 
than anything else, to the fact that unlike 
other oppressed people, the dead will 
eventually absorb all of us into their 
ranks. Thus, supporters of equal rights ac-
tions may well be acting exclUSively out 
of enlightened self interest. Regardless of 
motivations, however, H.R.A. proponents 
should be gratified indeed that an issue 
which only a short time ago was ignored, 
or even mocked, is today being con-
sidered for mention in the Constitution of 
the United States. Granted, the H.R.A., if 
passed, will likely result in a torrent of 
confusing litigation, complex holdings 
and general turmoil. However, consider-
ing America's historically discriminatory 
treatment of the dead, a broad constitu-
tional mandate of this nature appears to 
be the only definitive manner by which to 
ensure both the uniformity and integrity 
of the granting of freedoms so sorely lack-
ing today. 
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